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WHAT NATIONS ARE DOING ABOUT IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN DOWNTURN 
ECONOMIES: EXAMINING AND COMPARING THE RECENT TREATMENT OF 
IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN 
 
María Pabón López∗ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent times, economic migration across borders has posed 
challenges to nations integrating foreign workers into their economies.  These 
challenges are a result of two economic phenomena, which are in sharp tension 
with each other and are deeply impacting immigrant workers and their 
families.  The first phenomenon is the large-scale global movement of peoples 
that has led to countries where immigrant workers comprise a significant part 
of the workforce.  The second phenomenon is the current economic downturn, 
which came about following the global financial crisis and the slowdown in the 
construction industry.  In view of these two phenomena, there is a clear need 
for countries, where large numbers of immigrants work, to assess their 
responses to the presence of such immigrants within their countries during 
economic downturns. 
This article examines the current treatment of immigrant workers in the 
United States and Spain.  In particular, it examines how the American and 
Spanish legal systems respond to issues regarding their foreign workers during 
difficult economic circumstances.  This article analyzes the situations in Spain 
and the United States because: (1) both countries have large immigrant worker 
populations,1 (2) each has experienced terrorist attacks perpetrated by 
                                                        
*
 Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, B.A. Princeton University. I thank Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell and Allison Jolie 
Schwarz for organizing the International and Comparative Legal Perspectives on the Rights of 
Noncitizens Conference, for inviting me to speak at this conference, and for their hospitality 
during the conference.  The conference was sponsored by the Notre  Dame Journal 
of International, Comparative, and Human Rights Law.  I presented an earlier version of this 
article at the conference, which was held at the Notre Dame Law School in February of 2011.   
1
 There is another similarity that Spain and the United States share with regard to their 
immigrant populations.  Both countries are destinations to which irregular migrant workers 
arrive, and to which the passage can be extremely dangerous.  For migrants trying to enter the 
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noncitizens2 followed by anti-immigrant backlashes, and (3) both recently have 
experienced severe economic downturns in their economies.   
This article proceeds in three parts.  First, it examines the situation of 
undocumented workers in the United States before and after the recent 
economic downturn.  An examination is conducted through the lens of the U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,3 and its 
subsequent impact for undocumented workers.  This section also analyzes the 
situation of undocumented workers  in the U.S. following the downturn, 
through an assessment of the so-called “misery strategy.”4  This phrase, which 
first appeared in the New York Times, summarizes “[politicians’] one big idea   
. . . that harsh, unrelenting enforcement at the border, in the workplace and in 
homes and streets would dry up opportunities for illegal immigrants and 
eventually cause the human tide to flow backward.”5 
Second, the article examines the situation of immigrant workers in 
Spain, both before the economic downturn, when an amnesty program was put 
in place, and after the downturn, following the enactment of a voluntary 
immigrant return plan.  It compares the two approaches, contrasting Spain’s 
amnesty and subsequent voluntary return plan to the treatment of 
undocumented workers in the U.S., including the recent “misery strategy” of 
enacting a patchwork of state immigration laws.  Finally, the article concludes 
with thoughts about the appropriateness and viability of solutions crafted by 
the two countries regarding immigrants during difficult economic times. 
                                                                                                                                                  
United States surreptitiously from Mexico, the crossing of the Rio Grande and later travel 
through the desert is fraught with dangers including death.  For the period 1998 to 2010, a 
reported 4000 persons have died while attempting to cross to the United States.  See Dennis 
Wagner, U.S. Laws Blamed for Migrant Deaths, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/05/ 07/20100507immigrants-border-
deaths.html#ixzz0ymgiHdZ5 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).  Similarly, the voyage crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea from Africa to Spain is also extremely dangerous for would-be irregular 
migrants, who arrive in small boats called "pateras."  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SPAIN: 
THE SOUTHERN BORDER: THE STATE TURNS ITS BACK ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 
AND IMMIGRANTS 13 (2005), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/ asset/ 
EUR41/008/2005/en/2171a545-d4e8-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/eur410082005en.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
2
 While the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 are familiar to all worldwide, the 
March 11, 2004 coordinated bombing attack of commuter trains at the Atocha train station in 
Madrid were significant as well.  Nearly 200 persons were killed and over 1,400 wounded.  
See Elaine Sciolino, 10 Bombers Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, Mar. 11, 2004, N.Y. 
TIMES, at A1.  The ten simultaneous bombings were perpetrated by “a Moroccan cell with 
links to al-Qaeda . . . and most of those arrested have been Moroccan citizens.” Madrid 
Remembers Train Bombings, BBC NEWS, Mar. 11, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4338727.stm. 
3
 35 U.S. 137 (2002). 
4
 Editorial, The Misery Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at A18. 
5
 Id. 
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I.  IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The U.S. is home to an estimated 11.1 million unauthorized 
immigrants.6  Of these, the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 7.8 million of 
them are undocumented workers.7  Undocumented workers, also known as 
unauthorized workers, are those who have an irregular immigration status.  
Foreign workers in the U.S. comprise 15% of the U.S. workforce, or 23.9 
million workers.8  Undocumented workers constitute a subset of the foreign 
worker population.  It appears that foreign-born workers are experiencing the 
effects of the economic downturn disproportionately since data from 2009 
shows that the unemployment rate of the foreign-born workers was higher than 
that of the native born workers for the first time since 2003.9  In light of this 
data, how has the U.S. legal system treated these workers, even before the 
economic downturn? 
Ever since Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,10 a key U.S. 
Supreme Court decision from 2002, it is clear that undocumented workers have 
fewer rights—under both international human rights law and domestic labor 
law—than U.S. citizens or lawfully present workers.  A close review of 
Hoffman will illustrate why this is the case. 
 
A. Hoffman Plastic Compounds: The Case Analyzed 
 
In Hoffman, José Castro and other employees of the Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds chemical production plant in Los Angeles campaigned for a union 
by distributing authorization cards at their workplace.  They did this in support 
of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America, an 
AFL-CIO affiliate.11  One month after they began this activity, the company 
discharged the workers who were organizing for the union, including Mr. 
Castro.12  Subsequently, Mr. Castro and the other employees filed a complaint 
with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that the employer 
had committed unfair labor practices.  The NLRB ruled in favor of Mr. Castro 
and the other employees, ordering the company to (1) cease and desist from 
                                                        
6
 Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S., PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 
http://pewhispanic.org/unauthorized-immigration/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
7
 See B. LINDSAY LOWELL & RICHARD FRY, Estimating the Distribution of Undocumented 
Workers in the Urban Labor Force, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, at 6, (2002), 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6.1.pdf. 
8
 Bureau of Labor Stat., News Release, FOREIGN BORN WORKERS: LABOR FORCE 
CHARACTERISTICS 2009, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 
2011).  The Bureau of Labor Statistics notes that “the foreign born include legally-admitted 
immigrants, refugees, temporary residents such as students and temporary workers, and 
undocumented immigrants.” Id. 
9
 Id. 
10
 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
11
 Id. at 140. 
12
 Id. 
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further violations, (2) offer reinstatement and back pay to the employees, and 
(3) post a workplace notice regarding the order.13  
During his testimony at an administrative hearing held to determine the 
amount of back pay owed, Mr. Castro revealed information about his 
unauthorized entry into the U.S.  He also disclosed his lack of employment 
authorization and that he had used fraudulent documents to obtain 
employment.14  The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Mr. Castro back 
pay after taking this testimony into account.  Mr. Castro then appealed to the 
NLRB.  The NLRB reversed the ALJ’s decision and ordered back pay for three 
and a half years, calculated from the day of termination to the date that the 
company learned of Mr. Castro’s irregular immigration status.15  Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, following the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s enforcement of the 
NLRB’s back pay order.16 
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit.  In a 5-4 decision, the 
Court held that Congress’s federal immigration policy, as expressed in the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), prohibited the NLRB from 
ordering the remedy of back pay for an undocumented worker who never had 
legal authorization to obtain employment in the U.S.17  This decision resolved 
a circuit split, as the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals had allowed 
back pay awards to undocumented workers under the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) in contrast to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which held 
exactly the opposite, denying back pay to the undocumented worker.18 
The majority in Hoffman analyzed pre-IRCA precedent, Sure-Tan, Inc. 
v. NLRB.19  In Sure-Tan, the Court held that an employer committed an unfair 
labor practice by unlawfully reporting undocumented workers, who were union 
organizers, to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).20  The Court 
followed the view that an employer constructively discharges an employee 
when, in an effort to discourage union activity, it creates working conditions so 
intolerable that the employee is left with no choice but to resign.21  Regarding 
remedies for the unfair labor practice, the Court in Sure-Tan conditioned back 
pay for the undocumented workers who had already been deported by 
requiring their legal reentry into the country and that they be legally entitled to 
be present and employed in the U.S.22  This remedy shows that the Court 
balanced the NLRA’s policy protecting against unfair labor practices with the 
                                                        
13
 Id. at 140–41. 
14
 Id. at 141. 
15
 Id. at 142.  The amount of back pay (including interest) was calculated at $66,951.  Id.  
16
 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
17
 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149. 
18
 Id. at 142, n.2. 
19
 467 U.S. 883, 902–03 (1984). 
20
 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 144 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 894). 
21
 See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 887. 
22
 Id. 
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Immigration and Naturalization Act’s (INA) policy aimed at deterring 
immigrant from working while undocumented.23  
In its opinion, the Hoffman Court further inquired into immigration law 
and policy.  It did so by analyzing IRCA’s comprehensive scheme that 
prohibits the employment of undocumented workers and imposes the penalties 
on both employers and employees for violations of the scheme.24  In the 
Court’s view, Congress could not have meant for the NLRB to award back pay 
to an undocumented worker who (1) would be committing a crime by 
presenting false documents to obtain employment, and (2) could not mitigate 
damages for back pay by obtaining other work.25  Thus, the Court decided that 
immigration policy prevailed over labor policy when these two conflicted.  The 
immigration policy that prevailed was the IRCA’s prohibition against the 
hiring of undocumented workers.  
Even though the Court held that no back pay is available for 
undocumented workers, it did note in its opinion that other NLRA-imposed 
sanctions, such as cease-and-desist orders and posting of notices to employees 
of their rights, with contempt enforcement, continue to apply to undocumented 
workers.26  
The Court distinguished Hoffman from its precedent regarding back 
pay awards to workers who had engaged in criminal acts.  The Court noted that 
it had not deferred to the NLRB’s choices regarding remedies when they 
“potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the 
NLRA.”27  The Court also dismissed as a “slender reed”28 a Congressional 
report cited by the dissent, which stated that the IRCA “does not ‘undermine or 
diminish in any way labor protections in existing law, or . . . limit the powers 
of federal or state labor relation boards . . . to remedy unfair practices 
committed against undocumented employees.’”29  Finally, the Court noted that 
this situation needed to be “addressed by Congressional action,” not the 
courts.30 
Justice Breyer authored the dissent in Hoffman and Justices Souter, 
Stevens, and Ginsburg joined him.  The dissent first pointed out how all of the 
relevant agencies, including the Department of Justice—then in charge of 
overseeing INS activities—had stated to the Court that awarding back pay to 
an undocumented worker would not affect immigration policy.31  Then, the 
dissent warned that eliminating back pay from the NLRB's “remedial arsenal” 
left it with fewer “weapons” and only “future-oriented” remedies, such as 
cease and desist orders.  For the dissenters, this action was contrary to the 
                                                        
23
 Id.  
24
 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148.  
25
 Id. at 149, 151.  
26
 Id. at 152.  
27
 Id. at 144. 
28
 Id. at 150. 
29
 Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting)(citing H.R. No. 99-682 pt. 1, at 58 (1986)). 
30
 Id. at 152 (citing Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)). 
31
 Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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NLRA’s policy, since it allowed employers to violate labor laws “at least once 
with impunity.”32  
The dissent further noted that the majority opinion constituted the 
unwarranted removal of a “critically important remedial power” from the 
NLRB, and that it gave employers a greater incentive to hire undocumented 
workers.33  The dissent also criticized the majority for misapplying its own 
precedent in Sure-Tan, and concluded that in Hoffman, the NLRB’s award of 
back pay was reasonable and the majority should have respected it.34  Thus, the 
dissent criticized the majority for substituting its own view over that of the 
NLRB.35 
 
B. Effects of Hoffman, Especially Pertaining to International Human 
Rights 
 
Hoffman has had domestic law implications for undocumented workers, 
which have been extensively studied by leading scholars.36  From the 
perspective of international law, it is important to note that this opinion 
authorized an employer to withhold back pay when an undocumented worker 
was terminated for exercising his recognized human rights.  
In response to the Hoffman decision, the AFL-CIO filed a complaint 
with the International Labor Organization (ILO).37  The AFL-CIO alleged that 
the Supreme Court’s decision contravened Conventions 87 and 98 of the ILO, 
as well as the 1998 Declaration of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work.38  The protections afforded under these conventions are the fundamental 
rights to the freedom of association and to organize and bargain collectively.39  
The ILO ultimately ruled that the available remedies left to the NLRB after 
Hoffman were not adequate for effective protection against anti-union 
                                                        
32
 Id.  
33
 Id. at 155. 
34
 Id. at 160. 
35
 Id. at 161. 
36
 See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, the New Bracero Program and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal 
Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2003). 
37
 See Int’l Labor Org., Committee of Freedom of Ass’n, Rep. No. 332 (LXXXVII, 2003, 
Series B, No. 3), (U.S.) Case No. 2227, ¶¶ 554–56, May 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=1300&
chapter=3&query=((United+States))+%40ref&highlight=&querytype=bool&context= (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter ILO, Committee]. 
38
 See Int’l Labor Org., Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work, Sess. 86, 
Geneva (June 1998), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm. 
39
 See ILO, Committee, supra note 37, ¶¶ 554–56; Convention 87, 1948 Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, Art. 2, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C087 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); Convention 98, 
1949 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, Art. 2, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C098 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).  
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discrimination.40  The ILO did not mandate any form of remedy or sanction, 
but it did find that executive and congressional action should address the 
shortcomings raised by the Hoffman decision.41  Finally, the ILO urged the 
U.S. government to explore all possible solutions, including legislation, so that 
all workers in the country could be protected against anti-union discrimination 
following Hoffman.42 
To date, none of the ILO recommendations have been implemented.  
To do so would have meant an end to the “long overdue beginning” identified 
by Professor James Gross,43 in which international human rights are used to 
promote and protect the rights of domestic workers.  In fact, the result has been 
quite the opposite.  The U.S. government has carried out enhanced 
immigration enforcement.  As a result, during the Bush and Obama 
administrations, there have been increased workplace raids and pre-dawn raids 
at workers’ homes.44  No immigration reform has been enacted, not even the 
DREAM Act—a proposed federal law that would afford high-achieving 
undocumented students the opportunity to obtain lawful immigration status.45  
Instead, the U.S. has witnessed the so called “misery strategy”46 of increased 
federal immigration enforcement.  
In furtherance of the “misery strategy,” and filling the void left by the 
failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform, the U.S. has seen the 
enactment of a patchwork of state laws further restricting rights of non-U.S. 
citizens.  Such a state law is Arizona’s SB 1070.47  In 2010, forty-six states and 
                                                        
40
 See ILO, Committee, supra note 37, ¶¶ 554–56. 
41
 Id.  
42
 See id.  Notably, the Hoffman Plastic Compounds decision led to a lengthy advisory 
opinion by another international human rights body, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, issued in response to a complaint by the Government of Mexico.  See Legal Status and 
Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC 18/03 (2003) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Ser. A) No. 18 (2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr /series_A_OC-
18.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).  For a thoughtful discussion of this advisory opinion, see 
Doug Cassel, Equal Labor Rights for Undocumented Migrant Workers, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND MIGRANT WORKERS 477 (Anne F. 
Bayesfky ed., 2006). 
43
 See WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (James Gross ed., Cornell Univ. Press 
2003).  
44
 See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America became the Law of the Land: 
United States v. Brignoni Ponce, and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly 
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1041–42 (2010) (detailing immigration raid activity 
in several states, including the largest immigration raid in recorded history, which took place in 
Postville, Iowa in May of 2008).  
45
 See The Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act “DREAM Act,” S. 
2075, 109th Cong. (2005); The American Dream Act of 2006, H.R. 5131, 109th Cong. (2006).  
For an excellent discussion of the DREAM Act and how it relates to immigration reform, see 
Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the Legislative Process: A 
Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 1757 (2009).  
46
 Editorial, The Misery Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/09 /opinion/09thu1.html. 
47
 SB 1070, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0113, amended by 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0211 (H.B. 
2162, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010)). 
87 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 2011 
 87  
the District of Columbia passed 346 laws pertaining to immigration.48  The rise 
in the number of such laws has accompanied the downturn in the U.S. 
economy.49  This “misery strategy” has become even more pronounced 
following the economic downturn.   
 
II. IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN SPAIN 
 
A. Before the Economic Downturn 
 
In 2005, when the country was at its economic peak, Spain undertook 
what the New York Times called “an immigration experiment worth 
watching.”50  At the time, there were 1,714,256 undocumented persons in 
Spain out of a total population of 43 million.51  Of those, 1,175,577 
undocumented persons were estimated to be in the labor workforce.52  The 
process Spain undertook was called a regularización (also known as a 
normalización)—or a process of legalization of irregular immigrants.  This 
process granted lawful immigration status to undocumented workers in the 
country who could meet certain statutory requirements.  It also gave them the 
opportunity to obtain an employment contract with a Spanish employer.53  The 
undocumented workers who chose this process obtained an initial residence 
authorization, or residencia temporal, which granted them the right to live and 
work legally in Spain for one year.54  This one-year residencia temporal could 
                                                        
48
 National Conference of State Legislatures, Immigrant Policy Project, 2010 Immigration- 
Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (Jan. 1, 2010–Dec. 31, 2010), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21857 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
49
 Id. State laws related to immigration have increased dramatically in recent years.  In 2005, 
300 bills were introduced, 39 laws were enacted and six were vetoed.  In 2006, 570 bills were 
introduced, 72 were enacted, six were vetoed, and 12 resolutions were adopted for a total of 
84.  In 2007, 1,562 bills were introduced, 178 were enacted, 12 were vetoed, and 50 
resolutions were adopted for a total of 228.  In 2008, 1,305 bills were introduced, 139 laws 
were enacted, three were vetoed, and 64 resolutions adopted for a total of 203.  In 2009, more 
than 1,500 bills were introduced, 202 laws were enacted, 20 were vetoed, and 131 resolutions 
adopted for a total of 333.  In 2010, more than 1,400 bills were introduced, 208 laws were 
enacted, 10 were vetoed, and 138 resolutions were adopted for a total of 346.  See id. 
50
 David C. Unger, Editorial Observer: An Immigration Experiment Worth Watching in 
Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, §4, at p. 12. 
51
 Francisco Torres, La Regularización Extraordinaria: Luces y Sombras [Extraordinary 
Regulation: Lights and Shadows], PÁGINA ABIERTA (Spain), June 2005, at 160, available at 
http:// www.pensamientocritico.org/frantor0605.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).  
52
 Id. 
53
 See María Pabón López, Immigration Law Spanish Style: A Study of Spain's 
Normalizacion of Undocumented Workers, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 571, 572, 580–81 (2007). 
54
 See id. at 580, citing Real Decreto 2393/2004 de 30 de Diciembre, por el que se Aprueba 
el Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de Enero, Sobre Derechos y Libertades de los 
Extranjeros en España y su Integración Social [Royal Decree 2393/ Dec. 30, 2004, The 
Consistency of Regulation with the Natural Law/2000 Jan. 11, 2000, Concerning Rights and 
Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration], B.O.E. 2005, 323, Jan. 7, 2005, 
available at http://www.mtas.es/migraciones/proceso2005/RD2392_Regto_ Extranjeros.pdf. 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
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be renewed once for another two-year period.55  Finally, the granting of the 
residence in Spain would dismiss any deportation orders pending against the 
undocumented worker.56 
Of the nearly 700,000 undocumented workers who applied for the 
normalización, 573,270 obtained work and residence permits.57  This number 
was nearly the same as those who had been granted immigration status in the 
three previous regularizaciones.  Spain’s government assessed the 
regularización as a “great success” and estimated that it had reached 90% of 
the workers in the underground economy.58 
The 2005 regularización meant that Spain coordinated the needs of the 
undocumented workers with the needs of Spanish employers.59  There was no 
reluctance in Spain to meet the needs of the immigrant workers.  In fact, in an 
action that seemed to be welcoming to the immigrants, Consuelo Rumi, then 
State Secretary for Immigration, moved her office from its long-time 
placement in the Interior Ministry—the agency in charge of law 
enforcement—to the apparently more immigrant-friendly Ministry of Labor.60  
Thus, while the main goal of the normalización was to reduce illegal 
employment by regularizing foreign workers, it was also a form of state-
sanctioned recognition of the benefits of immigrant worker labor to Spanish 
society.  At the time, the authorities stated that: “If we want to maintain our 
economic model and a reasonable growth index, we need immigrant work, 
whether we like it or not.”61  
While the regularización was not without its critics,62 it appears to have 
at the very least been an open-minded governmental experiment to address 
both the needs of the Spanish labor market and the influx of undocumented 
workers.  The reaction of the Spanish labor unions, for example, is positive in 
that they found the normalización to be a success.63  However, a question 
arises: what would happen when the labor market does not need these 
workers? 
 
B. Immigrant Workers in Spain following the Economic Downturn 
 
In 2008, Spain continued experimenting with immigration when it 
enacted a voluntary repatriation plan known as “Plan de Retorno Voluntario” 
                                                        
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. at 583. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Unger, supra note 50, at 12. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Manuel Pimentel, Bienvenida la Regularización [Welcome Regularization], CINCO DÍAS 
[Spain], Feb. 9, 2005, available at 
http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/opinion/Bienvenida/regularizacion/cdsopiE00/20050209 
cdscdiopi_6/Tes/  (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (translation from Spanish by María Pabón 
López). 
62
 See López, supra note 53, at 583–85. 
63
 Torres, supra note 51, at 160. 
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(Plan of Voluntary Return).64  This plan gave certain lawfully present 
immigrant workers the opportunity to return to their countries of origin if they 
could not find employment in Spain.  If they followed the plan, they could take 
with them their accrued unemployment benefits.65  “Si has decidido regresar    
. . . tu eliges tu futuro” (“If you have decided to return, you choose your 
future”) has been Spain’s government slogan to promote its Plan de Retorno 
Voluntario.66  The rationale behind the plan is that Spain has been undergoing 
a harsh economic crisis, causing unemployment to rise in December 2008 to 
about 14%.67  Of late, Spain has one of the poorest performing economies in 
Europe.68  To cope with the crisis, Spain is sending noncitizen workers back 
home.   
In May 2009, the Spanish Minister of Labor and Immigration, 
Celestino Corbacho, stated that immigrants were suffering the consequences of 
the crisis more intensely and urged Spaniards to understand their situation.69  
He further urged Spaniards not think of immigrants as fugitives, but as Spanish 
citizens bearing the brunt of the crisis.70 
The Spanish Congress adopted the Plan de Retorno Voluntario on 
September 19, 2008.  Unlike previous immigration programs, like the 
regularización of 2005, which was of limited duration, this plan is 
permanent.71  Thus, there is no deadline for applications and the plan is still 
ongoing.   
The following are the requirements for an applicant to qualify for the 
Plan de Retorno Voluntario: (1) have either permanent or temporary lawful 
residence in Spain, (2) be unemployed due to employment termination, (3) 
have been registered at the Public Office of Employment, (4) be entitled to 
receive unemployment benefits, (5) that the applicant not incur any actions that 
would prohibit departure from Spain under Spain’s Immigration law, and (6) 
be a national of a country that has signed a bilateral agreement regarding social 
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security matters with Spain.72  A review of these requirements shows that 
undocumented workers are excluded from this program, presumably because 
they had the opportunity to regularize their immigration status three years 
prior. 
Since only citizens of the countries, which have subscribed a bilateral 
treaty with Spain on social security matters, are eligible for the plan, it is 
illustrative to list them.  They are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines,  the Russian Federation, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, the U.S., and 
Venezuela.73  Citizens from other countries not on this list, as well as those 
from the European Union, are excluded from the voluntary return program.  
The exclusion of E.U. citizens ensures that applicants will not claim 
their compensation, depart, and then return to Spain using E.U. freedom of 
movement policies.74  The exclusions of the program leave undocumented 
migrants, who are the most vulnerable to the crisis, without protection.  This 
group is comprised mostly of African workers (except those from Morocco and 
Tunisia) and a large percentage of Bolivians living in Spain.75  Again, most 
these countries are not included in the list.  Even if the workers were lawfully 
present and working in Spain, they would still be excluded.  Thus, the list of 
countries and the lawful status requirement exclude those who could benefit 
the most from the opportunity to return to their home countries with funds to 
invest.  This situation is in direct contrast to immigrants’ option of remaining 
in Spain without meaningful prospects for employment. 
By signing on to the Plan de Retorno, applicants agree to return to their 
country of national origin within thirty calendar days from the date of receipt 
of compensation and remain there for three years.76  The prohibition on 
returning to Spain is specific to work or professional activities.77  Thus, visits 
to Spain outside the scope of work or professional activities would be 
acceptable.  
The immigrant worker receives compensation in the form of a lump-
sum of uncollected unemployment benefits in exchange for voluntary return.78  
In addition to the compensation, the Spanish government will pay for 
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transportation, as well as €50 per family member for travel expenses, and 
incidentals.79  The amount of compensation depends on the contributions each 
immigrant worker has made to the social security fund while working in Spain.  
In essence, workers who have been collecting unemployment in Spain will 
only receive the remaining amounts in their funds.  Those who have not 
worked for a lengthy period of time will collect little compensation.  The 
payments average about € 9,035.80 
Immigrant workers who commit to the plan receive 40% of their 
compensation before leaving Spain and will collect the remaining 60% when 
they arrive in their countries of origin—once they appear to confirm their 
return to the Spanish embassy or consulate in their country.81  The immigrant 
workers have a maximum of ninty days, counted from the date of the first 
payment, to collect the second payment.82  Once the applicants relinquish their 
residence cards and other documents linking them to Spain, they will lose their 
rights to reside and work in Spain.83  These documents include work permits, 
national identity cards, social security cards, health care cards, and the like.  
After three years, those immigrant workers who had obtained 
permanent residence in Spain will be able to regain their status following a 
simplified process yet to be established by the Spanish government.84  
Immigrant workers who had only temporary residence will have to reapply for 
authorization to work and reside in Spain.  While the Spanish government has 
not guaranteed future employment authorization, it contemplates a “preferred 
right” for these workers to rejoin the Spanish workforce.85  However, the time 
spent outside Spain will not count for the residence calculations.86  Family 
members who do not have their own basis for lawful residence in Spain will 
also lose their status when the principal applicant agrees to return under this 
plan.87 
When the Minister of Labor and Immigration first announced the Plan 
de Retorno in June of 2008, he estimated that more than 1 million immigrant 
workers would opt to return home.  However, by October this number had 
dropped to 87,000 applicants.88 
The Instituto Nacional de Empleo (Spain’s Ministry of Labor) began 
receiving applications on November 17, 2008, and by the end of the first week, 
it had collected 256 applications.  In the weeks that followed, the volume of 
applications decreased.  The first month of the program closed with a total of 
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767 applications.89  Overall, approximately 5000 immigrant workers have used 
the Plan de Retorno Voluntario, leading some to call it a failure.90  The reasons 
for the immigrants’ reluctance to use the plan include “a rejection of the plan’s 
specific provisions.  ‘No one wants to give up their residency visa for three 
years, especially after they've suffered so much to get it . . . .’  But there’s an 
even more compelling answer, and it has to do with why new residents 
immigrated [to Spain] in the first place.  “I came for a better life,” says [one 
immigrant], “and I got it.  Food, clothing, my apartment—they’re all better 
here than in Bolivia.  I’m not interested in going back.”91  Thus, one of the 
main obstacles to the implementation of the plan would be the differences in 
the standard of living in Spain as opposed to the countries of origin of the 
immigrant workers.  As the plan is still in its initial stages, it is too early to 
fully determine its success. 
 
III. CONCLUSION  
 
These concluding thoughts are preliminary.  As the global economic 
crisis continues to unfold and migration patterns evolve, the solutions crafted 
by the U.S. and Spain regarding immigrants during difficult economic times 
will continue to develop. Further research is needed to analyze all the available 
alternatives for immigrants in downturn economies, including (1) the future of 
Spain’s Plan de Retorno Voluntario, (2) the existence of other bilateral return 
agreements between countries, and (3) individual savings accounts set up by 
employers and nongovernmental organizations for returning immigrants.  It 
would also be instructive to explore how to handle immigrants in the current 
downturn economy from the lens of what happened in the U.S. with the 
Braceros and the repatriation of Mexicans following World War II.  
Initially, it should be noted that the Spanish approach is more proactive 
and realistic.  The government of Spain, both before and after the economic 
downturn, took decisive action to address the issues confronting immigrant 
workers.  From the regularización to the voluntary return plan, Spain has not 
shied away from directly impacting the lives of the immigrant workers—
sometimes at great political risk.  It would appear that while still addressing the 
needs of the country and its economy, the Spanish solutions also address the 
human rights aspects of the situation.  Allowing undocumented workers the 
opportunity to regularize their immigration status and subsequently return to 
their countries, gives the workers some measure of humanity.   
This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in the United States.  The 
U.S. Congress has not addressed the situation of undocumented workers.  It 
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has failed to enact immigration reform in years, even with widespread 
agreement of the need for such reform.  The only immigration activity is 
increased enforcement by the federal government and increased encroachment 
of the states in enacting state immigration laws typically restricting 
immigrants’ rights.  
The “misery strategy” of the U.S. is ineffective because it aims to 
compel undocumented workers to leave the country.  However, instead of 
giving workers a choice, as does the system in Spain, they are driven away by 
the increased immigration enforcement and the patchwork of state laws that 
renders their lives miserable.  This approach might work, but “only if life for 
illegal immigrants in America could be made significantly more miserable than 
life in, say, rural Guatemala or the slums of Mexico City.  That will take a lot 
of time and a lot of misery to pull that off in a country that has tolerated and 
profited from illegal labor for generations.”92  Thus, the “misery strategy” is a 
race to the bottom, with erosion of human rights of immigrant workers as the 
casualty.  This situation is untenable, in light of the fact that “people [in the 
U.S.] cherish lawfulness but resist cruelty, and have supported reform that 
includes a reasonable path to earned citizenship.”93  It would appear then, that 
the “misery strategy” has no place in the U.S. policy and should be rejected 
and discontinued.  
Is Spain’s model a viable one for the U.S. to follow?  It is evident that 
the political will of the government in Spain is quite different from that of the 
U.S.  The number of immigrant workers in the countries’ respective economies 
differ greatly.  Such differences may hinder enacting the Spanish policy in the 
U.S.  Furthermore, the experiments Spain has undertaken have been subject to 
criticism and rejection.  The immigrant workers’ reluctance to leave Spain 
voluntarily is parallel to the “misery strategy,” because even in a bad economy, 
life in their host country is better than life in their own countries. 
The severe economic disparities between the host countries and the 
home countries will always make the host countries more attractive, even in 
downturn economies.  Thus, the host countries must be mindful of their 
obligations to treat immigrant workers in accordance with international human 
rights law, even in difficult economic times.  These are the times in which 
immigrant workers are most vulnerable, and their rights must be respected. 
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